

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

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STAT

TITLE: NSC Discussion Paper; Possible additional Steps
to be taken

1. UN aspects:

-- In the event of a Soviet intervention, we would move quickly, along with our Allies, to call for an emergency session of the UN Security Council.

-- In the present circumstances, no action in the UN is warranted until the situation clarifies. There are several options open to us if the situation worsens and Soviet intervention seems likely:

- a. Circulate a letter to SC members warning of imminent Soviet action.
- b. Call for informal consultations of the Security Council to consider the situation.
- c. Call for a formal meeting to consider what might be done by the Council to head off Soviet action.

Any SC action would be subject to a Soviet veto, but much action could add to the pressure on the Soviets not to intervene.

There will be an SC meeting Monday morning to consider a request by the Seychelles for a commission of inquiry to investigate the mercenaries attempted coup. We could raise the Polish situation for discussion at that meeting, but do not recommend any action at this time.

2. Presidential Briefing of Congressional Leaders: We might recommend that the President call key Congressional leaders to the White House Monday morning, December fourteen for a briefing on the latest Polish developments. We would not do this if it would interfere with our effort to calm the situation. Those invited should include:

State Dept. review completed

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The Senate:

- President pro tempore, Sen. Strom Thurmond
- Majority Leader Sen. Howard Baker
- Asst. Majority Leader Sen. Ted Stevens
- Minority Leader Robert Byrd
- Democratic Whip Sen. Alan Cranston
- SFRC Chairman Charles Percy
- SFRC ranking minority member Clairborne Pell

The House:

- Speaker Tip O'Neill
- Majority Leader Jim Wright
- Majority Whip Tom Foley
- Minority Leader Robert Michel
- Minority Whip Trent Lott
- HFAC Chairman Clem Zablocki
- HFAC ranking minority member William Broomfield

possible additions: Sen. Richard Lugar, Chairman of European Subcommittee of the SFRC
Rep. Lee Hamilton, Chairman EUR?M-Z Subcommittee of the HFAC.

3. Voice of America Broadcasts: Consider increasing present VOA broadcasts from 2½ hrs./day to 4 hrs. and 45 min./day. This action would improve public information flow in Poland to compensate for reduced domestic broadcasts. VOA's broadcast schedule to the rest of Eastern Europe would not be affected.

4. Ambassador Hartman should call on Foreign Minister Gromyko and reiterate the points Undersecretary Stoessel made to Amb. Dobrynin earlier.

5. Attached are the matrices of possible USG response to use of force by Polish authorities for consideration.

Attachments:

A. Matrices of Possible USG Response to Use of Force by Polish Authorities

Draft:H:TTowell:cb
Clear:HDFairbanks
EUR/EE:JDavis
EUR:JDScanlan

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POSSIBLE USG RESPONSE TO USE OF FORCE BY POLISH AUTHORITIES

While an eventual Soviet invasion of Poland cannot be ruled out, for the time being at least, it increasingly appears that the greatest danger to the Polish experiment will come from a possible use of repressive force by the Polish Government itself. The following matrix on possible USG responses to such an action attempts to loosely correlate various types of repressive force with appropriate USG/NATO responses. The matrix is, however, unidimensional, and in a real situation, our response would depend not only on the action actually taken by the Poles, but on the reaction to them on the part of Solidarity, the Church, and the West.

USG Action

Situation (not inclusive)	Vis-a-vis Poland	Vis-a-vis USSR
Use of military patrols.	Increased vigilance and observation of Polish events.	
Use of Military to assist in distribution of food and maintenance of order	Ask for clarification of purpose, extent and duration of action.	
Solidarity Members charged with anti-Soviet, anti-state acts.	Same as above.	
Limited Show of Force (E.G., Break-up of Demonstrations, no bloodshed).	Same as above.	
Strike ban announced.	Same as above.	
Limited Use of force for specific purpose (E.G., seizure of radio/TV stations, maintenance of public order) Minimal bloodshed.	In addition to above, warn Poles of impact which continued expanded use of force will have on East-West relations, future U.S. financial assistance.	Warn Soviets and EEs that continued use of force, which we view as instigated by Moscow, will have long-term impact on East-West relations.
		Discuss with Allies instituting AWACS surveillance flights in Western Europe.

* State of Emergency not required and will probably be avoided in order not to give permanence to action and to cut down on strength of Western reaction.

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USG ActionSituation (not inclusive)

State of Emergency declared;
no actions taken.

Curfew declared.

Solidarity declared
illegal.

2nd level Solidarity
leader arrested.

Some factories occupied;
bloodshed limited.

Top Solidarity leaders
including Walesa arrested,
bloodshed appears imminent.

Vis-a-vis Poland

Ask for clarification
of purpose, extent and
duration of action.

Inform Poles that US
will not participate
in any further meet-
ings to reschedule
Polish debt until
State of Emergency
(Stan Wyjatkowy) is
lifted and troops
return to barracks.

** Inform Poles that in
addition to above, USG
will not grant addi-
tional food aid, and
is suspending export
credits.

Same as above

Same as above

In concert with Allies
warn Poles we will
invoke "exceptional
circumstances" clause
of current debt re-
scheduling if Polish
repression leads to
bloodshed.

Vis-a-vis USSR

Inform Soviets and EEs
of steps being taken
vis-a-vis Poland and
remind them of serious
financial consequences
for USSR and Eastern
on its debts to the
West. Consult with
Allies on details of
economic sanctions.

Discuss with Allies
instituting AWACS
surveillance flights
in Western Europe.

Same as above

Same as above

With Allies warn
Soviets and EEs of
financial consequences
if Poles default and
of end to all Western
credits to Eastern
Europe.

Consult with
Allies on announcing
formal delay in all
arms negotiations
pending outcome of
Polish situation.

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USG ActionSituation (not inclusive)Vis-a-vis PolandVis-a-vis USSR

Troops sent to occupy
factories; large-scale
bloodshed, civil-war
appears imminent.

With Allies
announce complete
** cut-off of export
credits and food
aid. Consult with
Allies to invoke
"exceptional cir-
cumstances" clause
of current debt
rescheduling.

seek agreement
among Allies on NATO
political sanctions.

Same as above. (After
testing waters with
Allies, consider calling
emergency NAC meeting to
consider appropriate
measures, since such an
action is tantamount to
Soviet invasion.) Call Sec-
rity Council meeting to co-
sider steps to head off
Soviet intervention.
Emergency NAC ministerial
meeting called to consider
sanctions vis-a-vis USSR.

Soviet forces invited in
or come in on their own.

Same as above

** State of Emergency not required, but very likely given need to suspend
constitutional guarantees. Once State of Emergency declared, condition
is likely to remain in effect for some time.

Drafted: EUR/EE:DRHerspring
11/3/81 ext. 20575

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